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The Group of Seven (G7) leaders met for their 44th annual summit in 
Charlevoix, Canada in June 2018. Although the G7 has outlived many 
institutions of global governance, perennial doubts are cast upon it, 
particularly regarding its legitimacy and achievements. The Think 7/Idées 7 
is a group of 35 scholars from all over the world who met from 21 to 23 
May, 2018 at Laval University, Quebec City to identify key themes to be 
addressed at the Charlevoix Summit, communicating its findings to the G7 
leaders’ personal representatives. This Policy Insights paper builds on these 
discussions and looks ahead to the 2019 Biarritz Summit by making 
recommendations of how the G7 can play a leadership role. We argue that 
it should address new, unprecedented and highly disruptive issues that 
characterise our complex world, rather than well-understood international 
problems that fit into existing categories. We argue that the G7 can do this 
by playing to its strengths – informality and like-mindedness in particular – 
in addressing emerging and transversal issues such as Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and cryptocurrencies. 
 
 
A growing network of international institutions governs global politics. Most international 
institutions, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Tourism 
Organization, are tailored to exploit the known; they address enduring or well-understood 
international problems that fit into existing categories. These institutions cluster around 
familiar topics ranging from food security and tourism to the environment and trade. 
However, our complex world is a breeding ground for new issues, posing a unique 
challenge for these institutions. Think of the array of questions raised by artificial 
intelligence (AI), the transnational diffusion of the ‘Me Too’ movement, or the 
undermining effects created by the rise of populism. Emerging issues like these concern 
the unknown; they are often unprecedented, span multiple issue areas in their scope or in 
their consequences, and can be disruptive.  
  
Looking at variation in institutional formality and membership heterogeneity, our focus is 
on identifying the institutional forms that are best suited to meet the challenges posed by 
emerging issues that arise out of complexity. While no institution is perfectly adapted to 
this class of problem, we argue that informal institutions with like-minded memberships 
are better suited to tackling emerging issues than their formal and heterogenous 
counterparts for two reasons. First, informal institutions are flexible in their mandates, 
enabling them to tackle emerging problems that lie outside the scope of formal institutions. 
Second, when informal institutions have like-minded memberships, they are quicker to 
reach consensus and address these problems by formulating initial solutions, delegating to 
other institutions, or suggesting the creation of new institutions. Using the example of the 
G7, we show how informal institutions have addressed emerging issues in the past, and 









The world that policymakers try to govern is complex. It is made of various interconnected 
systems, whether they be economic, social and/or biophysical. These systems are 
themselves made of interacting elements, connected by positive and negative feedback 
loops. The trade system, for example, is made up of various types of domestic regulators, 
business associations, transnational corporations, certification organizations, and 
consumer groups. New and unpredictable outcomes emerge out of their interactions, as a 
result of nonlinear dynamics and network effects. Even policies adopted and technologies 
developed to address existing problems can inadvertently create other problems, including 
financial crises, environmental degradation, and human right abuses. Moreover, the pace 
of interactions and the emergence of new problems appears to be accelerating (Duit and 
Galaz 2008: 311). Far from being at the end of history, in our epoch, history appears to be 
speeding up.  
  
In response to this increasing complexity in the world and its nurturing of new issues, the 
governance system itself has become more complex. International treaties, organizations, 
partnerships, forums, groups, and dispute settlement mechanisms have proliferated 
rapidly. According to some accounts, countries have now concluded more than 790 trade 
agreements (Dür et al. 2014), 3300 investment agreements (UNCTAD 2018), 3500 tax 
agreements (Arel-Bundock 2017), and 3600 environmental agreements (Mitchell 2018). 
Yet, the proliferation of institutions is not a sufficient response to the new issues and 
challenges that accompany the unfolding complexity of the world. At least three reasons 
explain this insufficiency.    
  
First, institutions are notoriously sticky (Thelen 1999); they are historical entities, 
designed to deal with the pressing problems of their time rather than today’s emerging 
problems. The slow-moving International Telecommunication Union (created in 1865) 
would certainly look very different if it had been established in the fast-changing internet 
age. The same would hold if the tripartite structure of the International Labour 
Organization (founded in 1919) had been designed in the current period of a rising gig 
economy. Admittedly, organizations change over time and the scope of their activities can 
evolve. Despite this, institutional constraints ingrained in institutions’ DNA, as well as 
stabilization pressure coming from external actors, make international institutions heavily 
path-dependent. This legacy of the past restricts many institutions’ capacity to react 
promptly to emerging problems.   
  
Second, institutions are not distributed evenly in the governance landscape. They 
proliferate and overlap in some issue-areas, creating what is known as dense “regime 
complexes” (Raustiala and Victor 2004), but are absent from other issue-areas, leaving 
them in a “nonregime” state (Dimitrov et al. 2007). The accumulation of space junk, 
degradation of coral reefs, and recognition of professional qualifications for migrants, for 
example, are well-known global problems that are under-institutionalized. 
 
Third, proliferation often increases the cost of participation in the international system as 
it forces states to spread their resources across a greater number of institutions. 
Proliferation therefore limits the capability of less well-resourced states and constituencies 
to have their voices heard and to provide valuable inputs in the quest for innovative 





As a consequence, there is a mismatch between the dynamic and unpredictable world, on 
the one hand, and the stable and clustered institutional governance system, on the other 
hand (Young 2010). This mismatch leaves many emerging problems inadequately 
governed. These problems are often transversal in nature, such as gender inequality and 
cyber security. They cut across established issue-areas and call for changes in several 
disconnected institutions. In the absence of a centralized and hierarchical authority in 
global governance, institutions work in silos and tend to specialize rather than tackle 
transversal problems that they cannot adequately address by themselves.  
  
Another type of problem left poorly addressed by the current institutional architecture is 
regimes’ negative externalities on other regimes. The concern here is not that different 
regimes have incompatible rules. Blatant legal conflicts remain rare and a certain degree 
of normative ambiguity preserves the unity of the international legal system. Instead, 
problems emerge at the impact level (Gehring and Oberthür 2009). For example, trade 
agreements can have adverse effects on the state of the environment, and environmental 
agreements can have restrictive effects on trade. International institutions increasingly 
address these negative spillovers (Johnson and Urpelainen 2012), but they do so from their 
own particular standpoint, which is subject to bias and often superficial in nature.  
  
Third, traditional institutions are not well attuned to today’s unprecedented challenges.. 
Disruptive technologies, such as gene editing, killer robots and driverless cars, raise such 
challenges. The same is true of major alterations in social attitudes, as with gender or 
immigration. Established institutions are ill-prepared to address disruptive technologies or 
social change and setting up new specialized institutions to meet each new unprecedented 
challenge requires strong political drive and resources that are often lacking. Yet, failing 
to address these challenges from the outset at the international level increases the risk that 
the challenge is not solved or that a single country or company takes unilateral action and 
sets global standards in a suboptimal or an unethical trajectory.  
  
The argument here is not that institutions at the core of the current global governance 
system are fundamentally inept. They usually are not. Instead, we argue they are often ill-
prepared to tackle the specific class of emerging problems that grow out of the world’s 
complexity, including transversal issues, negative externalities and disruptive 
technologies. Building on the distinction between exploitation of the known and the 
exploration of the unknown (March 1991), the current governance system seems geared 
toward the former at the expense of the latter. Most institutions are designed to address 
well-understood collective action problems. They are relatively efficient at implementing, 
executing and refining earlier solutions. However, these institutions are often inflexible 
and poorly set up to experiment, innovate or take risks. As the world is complex, unstable 
and unpredictable, a governance system that engages in exploitation to the exclusion of 
exploration is likely to find itself “trapped in suboptimal stable equilibria” (March 1991, 
71). However, we suggest that some institutional forms that already exist in the governance 
system have the potential to engage in important exploratory activities. 
 
2. Informal institutions with a like-minded membership 
 
To identify the institutional forms best adapted to engage in exploratory activities, we 




and FORMALITY. While institutions differ in other ways, such as in their degree of 
centralization and their decision-making rules (Koremenos et al. 2001), institutional 
MEMBERSHIP HETEROGENEITY and levels of FORMALITY are particularly relevant to 
institutions’ ability to solve the three types of emerging problems identified above.  
 
The MEMBERSHIP HETEROGENEITY dimension asks: “How like-minded are an institution’s 
member states?”  International institutions have memberships that fall on a spectrum 
ranging from strongly “like-minded” states to extremely “diverse” states. In institutions 
with a strongly like-minded membership, members share either a general worldview or 
hold similar viewpoints on the specific issue area(s) that the institution addresses. We use 
"like-mindedness" here in a broad sense to encompass the presence of an overarching 
culture of cooperation within a community of interests. The European Union, for example, 
is an institution with a generally like-minded membership. Issues such as Brexit and other 
more recent fundamental disagreements within the EU on human rights and migration 
might make the EU appear less like-minded, yet its members nevertheless share broadly 
similar views on a range of core issues. These include EU members’ general support for 
the rule of law, human rights, and regional cooperation—even if they occasionally differ 
on their preferred solutions. Institutions with a diverse membership in contrast have 
members that mainly differ in their broad worldviews or specific opinions on a given topic, 
such as labour rights or environmental protection. Universal membership institutions, such 
as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), have 
strongly diverse memberships.  
 
The FORMALITY dimension is concerned with the question of “How institutionalized are 
an institution’s decision-making procedures?” To this end, FORMALITY is not a binary 
distinction between informal and formal but rather operates on a scale between the two. 
While existing research primarily focuses on more formal institutions, such as the World 
Bank or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in practice 
institutions vary greatly in terms of their degree of formality, with more informal 
institutions such as the G7 and G20 commonly co-existing with their formal counterparts 
(Vabulas and Snidal 2013). Formal international organizations are official bodies, 
legalized through a founding charter or treaty, which have official members, hold regular 
meetings, and are coordinated by a permanent secretariat or staff. Informal international 
organizations exhibit a lower level of institutionalization than their more formal 
counterparts. These organizations generally have associated members and host meetings, 
but lack a formal founding charter or agreement, a permanent secretariat, and/or other 
markers of institutionalization (Vabulas and Snidal 2013).  
 
While no institutional form is a panacea, a given institution’s MEMBERSHIP 
HETEROGENEITY and level of FORMALITY makes it better suited to address some problems 
than others. Beginning with MEMBERSHIP HETEROGENEITY, institutions with a like-minded 
membership tend to reach consensus on policy decisions more quickly than their more 
diverse counterparts. However, these institutions generally have a smaller membership that 
may be unable to adequately solve global problems and lack the legitimacy of 
organizations with a larger or universal membership. Diverse membership organizations, 
while slower moving and sometimes unable to reach any form of consensus, are well 




Turning to FORMALITY, formal institutions are often suited to address enduring and well-
understood problems that fit into existing issue categories and established policy silos. 
They are adapted to engage in incremental change that refines earlier policies and 
solutions. However, as formal organizations are relatively inflexible in their scope—due 
to their explicit mandates—they may be unable to turn their attention to new problems that 
emerge under complexity. Informal organizations, in contrast, tend to have a more flexible 
scope, making them more capable of addressing new problems that lie outside of the 
mandate of other organizations.  
 
The interaction of institutional MEMBERSHIP HETEROGENERITY and FORMALITY leads to 
four organizational ideal types, depicted in Table 1: (1) Formal diverse institutions; (2) 
Formal like-minded institutions; (3) Informal diverse institutions; and (4) Informal like-





































Table 1: Institutional Membership and Formality 
 
The combination of an institution’s level of FORMALITY and degree of MEMBERSHIP 
HETEROGENEITY affects its capacity to deal with emerging problems. Formal institutions, 
due to their path dependencies and scope constraints, whether diverse (1) or like-minded 
(2) in their memberships, are less well-adapted to meet the challenges associated with 
solving emerging problems than their informal counterparts. However, once emerging 
problems have been identified, and in some cases, potential solutions even tested, new and 
existing formal institutions are in a strong position to be delegated to or to continue the 
activities of their informal counterparts. Informal diverse institutions (3) are flexible in 
scope, enabling them to focus on emerging challenges; however, in practice, these 
institutions often struggle to reach the level of consensus necessary to engage in 
meaningful action. Due to this difficulty, these organizations are often best suited to be 
“second-movers,” building on momentum from the activities of quicker informal like-





The characteristics of informal like-minded institutions (4) make them the best situated to 
meet the three complexity-related challenges identified with emerging problems: 
transversality, negative externalities, and lack of precedent. The flexible scope of these 
institutions makes them better able to address these problems than their counterparts. In 
addition, these institutions are more likely to reach the required level of consensus to 
address these problems than diverse membership institutions. Even when solutions to 
emerging problems require buy-in from a range of states that is broader than a subset of 
like-minded states, informal like-minded institutions can serve as test labs for future global 
solutions, as first movers setting trends for other states and institutions, as orchestrators of 
their activities, or as the creators of new institutions. While like-minded informal 
institutions, such as the G7, are often derided for being elitist or “talking shops,” we 
suggest that they are well adapted to play an important role in exploring the unknown and 
addressing the flow of emerging problems in our complex world.  
 
3. The G7’s record in handling emerging problems  
 
When it first met as a G6 in November 1975, the G7 could clearly be characterized as an 
informal institution with like-minded members. In the case of membership heterogeneity, 
the Rambouillet Summit was designed to be a small grouping of the like-minded leaders 
of France, the US, the UK, West Germany, Japan and Italy. In the absence of membership 
criteria, the declaration that emerged from Rambouillet emphasized that “[w]e came 
together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for 
the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social 
advancement” (G7 Information Centre, 1975). Since then, membership has been carefully 
managed to embrace similar like-minded partners that meet the criteria of these shared 
values, such as Canada in 1976 and the EU in 1997. The one occasion when the criteria 
were ignored in order extend membership to Russia from 1998 for strategic reasons ended 
in failure when its membership was suspended in 2014 over the annexation of Crimea and 
interference in Eastern Ukraine. 
  
In the case of formality, the Rambouillet Summit placed a low level of formality at the 
heart of the group. This first summit was intended to be a one-off, fireside chat between 
mutually recognizing great powers of the day in response to pressing macroeconomic 
challenges. The 1973 oil crisis was one of the key emerging issues of its time and it called 
for a informal coordination among key world leaders. Summit discussion focused on 
whether it was even necessary to release a declaration. Since then, despite attempts to 
formalize the summit process, for example by expanding the size of delegations to the 
ministerial level, the G7 has regularly resisted such developments, pared itself down and 
returned to its roots as an informal gathering. 
  
Over a history of forty-four summits from Rambouillet to Charlevoix, these defining 
characteristics are evident in the cases where the G7 has responded successfully to global 
collective action problems whether they be transversal, demonstrate negative externalities, 
lack any precedence, or all of the above. For example, despite its initial focus on global 
macroeconomic issues, the G7 came to play a central role in the biggest structural 
challenge of the post war period that embraced all three types of emerging problems: the 




the end of the Cold War. However, it was more successful than traditional international 
institutions in its response to the cross-cutting nature of a challenge with considerable 
potential for negative spillovers that lacked a pre-existing roadmap showing how to 
respond. From the end of the 1980s and through the 1990s, it was the G7 that acted as the 
vehicle for managing the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe’s transitions to democracy and 
capitalism. On one hand, this was achieved by embracing the Russian leadership (whether 
Gorbachev or Yeltsin) within the limited membership and informality of the G7 through 
an incremental process from 1989 to ultimately create a G8 in 1998. On the other hand, it 
was facilitated through the creation at the 1989 Paris Summit of the Group of Twenty-
Four, a new body that was delegated with the task of channelling assistance to Central and 
Eastern Europe (G7 Information Centre, 1989). 
  
Related to the unravelling of Cold War structures, conflict resolution in the former 
Yugoslavia, although a traditional security issue in some ways, represents several of the 
characteristics of emerging problems that the G7 is well-positioned to address as a result 
of its limited membership and informality. In particular, the Kosovo conflict spanned two 
G8 presidencies – the UK in 1998 and Germany in 1999 – and saw the G8 foreign 
ministers, including crucially Russia, negotiate the terms of the Yugoslav withdrawal, the 
role of NATO and the deployment of peacekeepers as well as draft the wording of the 
related UN resolution prior to the G8 Cologne Summit of June 1999. In the words of 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright ‘I knew I would have been furious, had I still been 
UN ambassador, that the foreign ministers were doing our job’ (Albright, 2003, p. 535). 
Thus, in this case, the G7/8 as a small and informal group of the relevant stakeholders was 
better suited to lay the groundwork for an innovative solution than the more formal, diverse 
and legalistic organizations like the UN. 
  
Finally, global health in many ways represents the transversal issue of our age but also a 
challenge that has resulted in one of the G7’s most high-profile successes. As global health 
emerged as a multifaceted, wide-ranging and highly disruptive issue at the turn of the 
millennium, the G7 (or G8 as it was then) responded rapidly by championing the cause at 
the 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit and thereafter. At this summit, ‘…foundations were 
laid for a new multisectoral and more deliberative institution that could respond to global 
public health priorities…. [T]he G8 countries acknowledged a need to create a new and 
more inclusive institution in order to effectively respond to global infectious diseases’ 
(Brown, 2010, p. 517). This resulting momentum continued through future G8 summits, 
embraced the UN, donor and developing countries as well as civil society and led to the 
creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria that has sought to 
move away from a model of silo-working towards a genuinely coordinated response to the 
challenge. 
  
Across these examples, the G7 demonstrated itself to be nimble and responsive as a result 
of its size and shared values but also realistic about its own capabilities and willing to 
create or delegate to more formal organizations as “second-movers”. At the same time, the 
G7 frequently (and unsuccessfully) addresses traditional issues that are better handled by 
more formal or more universal institutions. Trade liberalization and climate change are 
two prominent examples of recurring issues on the G7 agenda that the G7 is poorly 
designed to address. We hope that the next G7 summit will build on its competitive 





4. Emerging issues for the 2019 Biarritz Summit 
 
Issues that are currently insufficiently addressed by the network of existing international 
institutions are particularly those that transcend narrow issue-areas and whose emergence 
is potentially difficult to foresee. As stated in the introduction, most international 
institutions are suited to address the known problems (and they even struggle with this) 
that can fit into existing categories, programs and funding lines. Yet increasing complexity 
and interconnectedness have resulted in, and are likely to continue to produce, enormous 
challenges. We argue in this article that the G7 as an informal, like-minded group might 
be best suited at least to begin to address these issues by: identifying and framing the 
problem at hand, assuming leadership, setting a precedent and providing a model that other 
states or organizations can embrace in one form or the other. As an informal institution, it 
has shown an adaptive capacity that more formal institutions lack and that might make it 
more prone to deal with “emergent” challenges whose impacts – positive or negative – 
remain “largely, if not wholly, unsettled” (Campbell-Verduyn, 2018: 6). As a conclusion 
to this article, we illustrate some emerging issues that the G7 might be able to address 
(better than others) in the future, including at the upcoming meeting scheduled to take 
place in Biarritz in August 2019. 
 
Rapid advances in digitalization and automation have a fundamental impact on all aspects 
of life yet are inadequately addressed in formal international institutions or other forms of 
cross-border agreements. One aspect concerns the potential weaponization of AI (through 
so called ‘killer robots’ or other automated weapon systems that can operate without 
human interference). These new technological developments pose unknown dangers to 
stability and peace in the international system and its innovations in weaponry raise the 
possibility of “near instantaneous wars of global scope” (Deudney, 2018). The G7 could 
engage in the development of a new form of “preventative security governance” (Garcia, 
2018) that regulates the further weaponization of AI. This area – despite its uncertainties 
– is one in which coordination and integration of governance should be within the grasp 
of a like-minded group such as the G7 since there is both scientific certainty and consensus 
regarding the impending dangers (Garcia, 2018). In these fields, the G7 could also engage 
with businesses that should have an interest in avoiding civilian casualties and tap into 
existing efforts by the epistemic community and civil society (such as the International 
Committee for Robot Arms Control and its Campaign to Stop Killer Robots) in order to 
galvanize broader support for a preventative governance initiative.  
 
Also at the centre of much discussion of emerging risk without proper global cooperation 
are cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology. While these technologies empower 
specific actors, as when they provide migrants that are unable to open official bank 
accounts with a tool to transfer and receive funds, they also open wide windows for 
criminal activities such as black market trading and corruption by circumventing banks 
and other institutions usually tasked with monitoring and information-sharing. This 
decentralization can lead to massive damages for both individuals and institutions without 
an authority in place that could deal with losses and damages, for instance via theft or 





There is growing demand for the regulation of the cryptocurrency market, yet there is no 
agreement about how to do this. While countries like Japan have a more open approach, 
China is more strict in allowing and protecting specific transactions. For instance, “initial 
coin offerings” (ICOs) have attracted highly speculative investment interests in this form 
of crowd-financing in Europe and the US. How to classify these ICOs (whether as 
currency, commodity, security, property, deposit) is highly contested because the 
particular conditions vary from issuer to issuer. This means that assets can be “easily 
transferred and their origins are difficult to trace. Tokens could be issued in a more token-
friendly jurisdiction in Japan. The same tokens could end up in the hands of unassuming 
retail investors in stricter jurisdictions such as the US” (Masie, 2018). This cross-border 
non-coordination allows token companies to choose jurisdictions that have more 
permissible rules. Experts call for international coordinated regulation. The G7 could 
advance this agenda by, first, supporting the “investment in technologies that makes the 
provenance of tokens clearer while preserving their encryption” (Masie 2018) for instance 
through a standard “indicator of origin” harmonized initially across G7 nations but 
potentially as a model for other countries to buy into. As the origin of the token could be 
tracked in this way, it would make illegal transactions and money-laundering much more 
difficult. Companies would, even without an embrace by their host countries, sign up to 
this standard as it builds trust in an extremely volatile and risk investment environment.  
 
To be sure, AI and cryptocurrencies are not the only emerging issues, and perhaps not the 
most pressing ones. Other challenges include climate engineering, human biotechnologies, 
internet privacy, automation of traditional jobs, e-commerce, space junk, gene editing, 
antibiotics resistance, driverless cars and news fact-checking. Formal and universal 
intergovernmental organizations can hardly handle these emerging questions, either 
because they are transversal in nature and they require prioritization across issue-areas, or 
because the disruption they create calls for unprecedented responses. The informal and 
like-minded G7 is better suited than other institutional forms to frame these issues, set the 
agenda, and call for policy actions. Unfortunately, the G7 has not always built on the 
competitive advantages offered by its institutional design. While some see the G7 as 
nothing more than a ‘photo op’ or a ‘global hot tub party’ (cited in Kirton et al. 2010: 90), 





Albright, M. (2003) Madam Secretary: A Memoir. New York: Hyperion. 
Arel-Bundock, V., (2017). ‘The Unintended Consequences of Bilateralism: Treaty 
Shopping and International Tax Policy’, International Organization, 71(2), pp.349-
371.  
Benvenisti, E. and G.W. Downs (2007), ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy 
and the Fragmentation of International Law’, Stanford Law Review, 60 (2), pp. 595-
631.  
Brown, G.W. (2010) ‘Safeguarding Deliberative Global Governance: The Case of the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria’, Review of International 
Studies, 36 (2), pp. 511-530. 
Campbell-Verduyn, M. (2018) ‘What Are Blockchains and How Are They Relevant to 




Verduyn (ed.), Bitcoin and Beyond: Cryptocurrencies, Blockchains, and Global 
Governance. London: Routledge, pp. 1-24.  
Deudney, D. (2018) ‘Turbo Change: Accelerating Technological Disruption, Planetary 
Geopolitics, and Architectonic Metaphors’, International Studies Review, 20 (1), pp. 
223-231. 
Dimitrov, R. et al. (2007) ‘International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda’, International 
Studies Review, 9 (2), pp. 230-258. 
Duit, A., and Galaz, V. (2008) ‘Governance and Complexity—Emerging Issues for 
Governance Theory’, Governance, 21(3), pp. 311-335. 
Dür, A., Baccini, L. and Elsig, M. (2014) ‘The Design of International Trade Agreements: 
Introducing a New Dataset’, Review of International Organizations, 9 (3), pp. 353-
375. 
G7 Information Centre (1975) ‘Declaration of Rambouillet’ [online]. Available from: 
www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1975rambouillet/communique.html [Accessed 17 
August 2018]. 
G7 Information Centre (1989) ‘Declaration on East-West Relations’ [online]. Available 
from: www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1989paris/east.html [Accessed 17 August 2018]. 
Garcia, D. (2018) ‘Lethal Artifical Intelligence and Change: The Future of International 
Peace and Security’, International Studies Review, 20 (1), pp. 334-341. 
Gehring, T. and Oberthür, S. (2009) ‘The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between 
International Institutions’, European Journal of International Relations, 15 (1), pp. 
125-156. 
Johnson, T. and Urpelainen, J. (2012) ‘A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and 
Separation’, International Organization, 66 (4), pp. 645-677. 
Kirton, J, Roudev, N. and Sunderland, L. 2010 ‘Finance and Development Compliance in 
the G8: The IMF and World Bank Role’ in Making Global Economic Governance 
Effective, ed by Kirton, J., Larionova, M., and Savona, P., Routledge.  89- 106 
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C. and Snidal, D. (2001) ‘The Rational Design of International 
Institutions’, International Organization, 55 (4), pp. 761-799. 
Masie, D. (2018) ‘Why It Would Be in Everybody’s Interests to Regulate 
Cryptocurrencies’. Available from: https://theconversation.com/why-it-would-be-
in-everybodys-interest-to-regulate-cryptocurrencies-91168 [Accessed 27 August 
2018]. 
March, J.G. (1991) ‘Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning’, 
Organization Science, 2(1), pp. 71-87. 
Raustiala, K. and Victor, D.G. (2004) ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic 
Resources’, International Organization, 58 (2), pp. 277-309. 
UNCTAD (2018) World Investment Report. Geneva: UNCTAD.  
Vabulas, F. and Snidal, D. (2013) ‘Organization without Delegation: Informal 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental 
Arrangements’, Review of International Organizations, 8 (2), pp. 193-220. 
Young, O.R. (2010) ‘Institutional Dynamics: Resilience, Vulnerability and Adaptation in 




Jean-Frédéric Morin is Associate Professor at Laval University, where he holds the 




projects look at institutional interactions, treaty design and policy diffusion in the fields of 
trade, intellectual property and environment. His working papers can be downloaded from 
www.chaire-epi.ulaval.ca 
 
Hugo Dobson is professor of Japan’s international relations at the University of Sheffield 
and fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences. His research and teaching focus on global 
governance, G7 and G20 summits and Japan’s role therein. 
 
Claire Peacock is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Advanced International 
Studies (HEI) at Université Laval and the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser 
University. Her work focuses on international cooperation and the design of international 
institutions.  
 
Miriam Prys-Hansen is lead research fellow at the GIGA German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies and the Academic Director of GIGA’s Doctoral Programme. Her research 
focuses on how power shifts in international politics are changing institutions of global 
and regional governance.  
 
Abdoulaye Anne is professor at the Department of Educational Foundations and Practices 
at Université Laval. As an educational policy specialist, he is researcher at the Center for 
Research and Intervention on Academic Achievement (CRIRES) and the Interdisciplinary 
Center for Research on Africa and the Middle East (CIRAM). 
 
Louis Bélanger is a professor of International Relations in the Department of Political 
Science and the director the Institute for Advanced International Studies (HEI) at 
Université Laval. His research focuses on the design and evolution of international 
institutions. 
 
Peter Dietsch is a professor of philosophy at the Université de Montréal. His research 
focuses on questions of economic ethics. He is the author of Catching Capital - The Ethics 
of Tax Competition (Oxford University Press, 2015) and co-author of Do Central Banks 
Serve the People? (Polity Press, 2018). 
 
Judit Fabian is currently a visiting research scholar in the Graduate School of Public and 
International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, where she is advancing her research in 
the area of democratic global economic governance, which she is developing under her 
idea of inclusive global institutionalism.  
 
John Kirton is a professor of political science at the University of Toronto and the director 
and co-founder of the G7 Research Group and the G20 Research Group. His research 
focuses on summitry, global governance, climate change, global health governance and 
Canadian foreign policy. 
 
Raffaele Marchetti is Associate Professor of International Relations and Deputy Rector 
for Internationalization at LUISS. His research focuses on global governance, 





Simone Romano is Senior Fellow and Head of the International political economy area at 
the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). He is also Researcher and Adjunct Professor at 
Roma Tre University. His research focuses on global economic governance, international 
macroeconomics and economic policy.  
 
Miranda Schreurs is Professor of Environment and Climate Policy, Technical University 
of Munich. Her research focuses on climate change, low carbon energy transitions, and 
environmental movements.  
 
Arthur Silve is Assistant Professor at Laval University in the Economics Department. His 
work is in the field of political economics, and focuses on issues related to development 
and institutions.  
 
Élisabeth Vallet is Scientific Director and Adjunct Professor at the Raoul-Dandurand 
Chair of the University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) as well as Quebec research lead 
for the Borders in Globalization program (UVic). Her current research focuses on issues 
related to globalization and border governance.  
